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SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

DELINEATING BETWEEN CONCILIATION AND ADJUDICATION:
A COMMENT ON RESNIK AND CURTIS’S
REPRESENTING JUSTICE

AMALIA D. KESSLER*
INTRODUCTION
Judith Resnik and Dennis Curtis’s Representing Justice: Invention,
Controversy, and Rights in City-States and Democratic Courtrooms is a
masterful undertaking that defies easy categorization.1 Based on painstaking
years of research, the book crosses conventional disciplinary boundaries,
drawing on legal history, art history, cultural history, political and social
theory, and empirical social science data to reflect on the evolution of practices
and representations of adjudication (primarily in the West) from the ancient
world to the present. The authors shed light on the complex interrelationship
between adjudicatory practice, state power, and political (and visual) culture.
They ultimately conclude that modern public adjudication in its recent,
twentieth- and twenty-first-century form is a powerful discursive sphere that is
vital for sustaining robust democratic self-governance, but is in danger of
collapse.2
The remarkable scope of Representing Justice—chronological, thematic,
and methodological—is such that it will undoubtedly serve to provoke
discussion across a broad array of subjects and disciplines for many years to
come. This breadth does, however, pose a significant challenge for the
commentator in that there is no way within the scope of these few pages to
engage meaningfully with all of the many fascinating issues that the authors
raise. After briefly describing the book’s core themes and approaches, I
therefore focus the remainder of my remarks on one particular topic that is a
longstanding interest of mine, but also central to the historical and normative

* Lewis Talbot and Nadine Hearn Shelton Professor of International Legal Studies, and Professor
(by courtesy) of History, Stanford University.
1. JUDITH RESNIK & DENNIS CURTIS, REPRESENTING JUSTICE: INVENTION,
CONTROVERSY, AND RIGHTS IN CITY-STATES AND DEMOCRATIC COURTROOMS (2011).
2. See id. at 14–17, 306–10.
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ambitions of Resnik and Curtis’s book—namely, the practice of conciliation
(or mediation) and its complex relationship to adjudication.3
I. THE BOOK
The book is framed, in part, as a puzzle. Pointing to a broad range of
images, the authors demonstrate that people across cultures today recognize as
a representation of Justice the figure of a woman in Grecian robes, standing
with scales in one hand and sword in the other, and usually (though not
always) blindfolded.4 This image of Justice, they show, has an astoundingly
long history, dating back at least as far as ancient Rome,5 but with evident
precursors in Babylonia, Egypt, and Greece.6 But as they are quite careful to
note, such continuities in the representation of Justice are matched by a striking
array of discontinuities. Unlike today, Justice was once commonly depicted
alongside an ostrich,7 as well as the three other Cardinal Virtues with whom
she was long associated (namely, Prudence, Temperance, and Fortitude).8 And
until the eighteenth century, Justice typically appeared without a blindfold.9
Moreover, in earlier centuries, the visual imagery adorning the halls of state
power was quite broad-ranging, extending beyond Justice to include
representations of various biblical and classical allegories, designed to serve
such didactic purposes as reminding judges to be dutiful servants of the ruling

3. Proponents of alternative dispute resolution, or ADR, often use the terms mediation and
conciliation interchangeably to refer to the practice whereby a third party attempts to persuade
disputants to agree to some kind of compromise. Jean R. Sternlight, In Search of the Best
Procedure for Enforcing Employment Discrimination Laws: A Comparative Analysis, 78 TUL. L.
REV. 1401, 1406 n.7 (2004). To the extent that scholars distinguish between these terms, they
usually assert that mediation is (1) more formal and structured than conciliation, and (2) more
concerned with protecting the disputants’ autonomy. See, e.g., KATHERINE V.W. STONE,
PRIVATE JUSTICE: THE LAW OF ALTERNATIVE DISPUTE RESOLUTION 6–7 (2000); Sternlight,
supra, at 1406 n.7. For the sake of communicative ease, I use the term “conciliation” throughout
much of this Essay to refer to any form of dispute resolution in which a third party promotes a
negotiated compromise. I opt for “conciliation” rather than “mediation” for two reasons. The
first is because, as discussed below, this was the term employed in a set of nineteenth-century
writings, debates, and institutions that proved very important in shaping modern conceptions of
adjudication. The second is that there is good reason to suspect that conciliation of the earlymodern variety was not particularly attentive to the parties’ wishes and thus lacked the focus on
disputant autonomy viewed as essential to mediation today.
4. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 1–17.
5. Id. at 22.
6. Id.
7. Id. at 77.
8. Id. at 8.
9. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 95–96 (discussing evolving opinions regarding
“what Justice ought to ‘see’”).
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elite and to recall the suffering (and often violence) entailed in the exercise of
judicial power.10
Why has a certain iconography of Justice remained largely fixed and
stable, the authors inquire, even while important aspects of its representation
have changed so dramatically? This art-historical puzzle, they suggest, bears
directly on practices of justice in that there is an important linkage between
visual representations of Justice and the actual exercise of state power.11 Just
as images of Justice have retained certain continuities across time, even while
transforming in fundamental ways, so too practices of adjudication have
remained to a degree constant, even while the nature and purposes of
adjudication have morphed, in many ways, beyond recognition.12
A core argument of the book is that adjudication is a pre-democratic
practice with important proto-democratic elements that contributed to the
eventual rise of democracy.13 Dating back at least as far as the city-states of
the Renaissance and early-modern West (and perhaps farther), jurists were
long admonished to hear both sides before reaching judgment, “to treat the
poor as one would the rich, and to refuse bribes.”14 Moreover, there is a long
tradition (by no means exclusive or unbroken) of holding certain judicial
proceedings in public fora.15 According to Resnik and Curtis, judges who
were compelled to listen to both sides, to attempt to treat rich and poor alike,
and to do so in public view, found themselves over time unwittingly breaking
down status hierarchies and searching for justifications for the exercise of state
power that would be widely accepted as legitimate.16 As a result, adjudication
came to serve as a “paradigm for responsible, popularly responsive, and hence
democratic governance.”17 In this way, pre-modern practices of adjudication
whose initial purposes were in no way democratic—including, for example,
the common practice of publicizing certain proceedings with an eye towards
inspiring awe and subservience among a passive populace—ended up
(ironically) contributing to the rise of democratic government.18
Tying together these accounts of continuity and discontinuity in the visual
representation of Justice and in practices of adjudication is a third narrative
concerning the evolution of the physical space in which justice is represented

10. Id. at 25–29 (exploring and contrasting The Allegory of Good Government and The
Allegory of Bad Government, two frescoes painted in Siena’s Palazzo Pubblico in the fourteenth
century).
11. See id. at 375–76.
12. Id. at 375.
13. Id. at 95.
14. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 289.
15. See id. at 26.
16. See id. at 289.
17. Id.
18. Id. at 295, 301–02.
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and adjudication occurs. As Resnik and Curtis discuss, the Renaissance and
early-modern period witnessed a growing trend towards rulers bringing
adjudicatory proceedings, once often held outside, into specially constructed,
multi-purpose municipal buildings or town halls—in no small part with the
goal of containing unruly crowds.19 But from the eighteenth century onward
(and with increasing rapidity in the nineteenth), these multi-purpose civic
structures gave way to single-purpose buildings, including most importantly,
courthouses.20 Like the older town halls from which they derived, modern
courthouses are grandiose structures located at the center of town, where they
were built to symbolize and bolster state power—and (not unrelatedly) attract
commercial activity.21 But unlike their predecessors, their very name (as well
as internal design) revealed a new focus on a single governmental activity—
This surge in “justice
namely, court proceedings or adjudication.22
architecture” throughout the world was in part the result of the coordinated,
global efforts and interests of three professional groups: lawyers, judges, and
architects.23 But according to the authors, it also followed from (and
contributed to) a new tendency to view adjudication as a defining feature of
modern, democratic governance, such that the physical structure of the
courthouse served as an embodiment of the community’s political ideals.24
Accordingly, by the twentieth century, the courthouse had to some extent
replaced the centuries-old image of Justice as the dominant symbol of state
power.25
Resnik and Curtis close the book by arguing that adjudicatory practice not
only helped give rise to democracy as a historical matter, but also is crucial for
sustaining it today.26 Drawing on the work of legal, political, and social
theorists ranging from Jeremy Bentham27 to Jürgen Habermas,28 they suggest
that public adjudication constitutes a vital public sphere in which members of
society (including not only litigants, lawyers, and judges, but also audience
members) can discuss and debate the kind of community in which they hope to
live, thus engaging in democratic self-governance.29 But while the authors
view public adjudication as key for enabling the successful functioning of

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 134.
Id. at 136, 141.
Id. at 136, 139, 141.
Id. at 136.
Id. at 136, 194.
RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 141–42.
Id. at 338 (describing courthouses as the “indisputable focus” of local government).
See id. at 301.
See id. at 295–99.
See id. at 300.
RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 301.
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democratic government, they also suggest that its long-term survival is far
from secure.30
In line with the egalitarian impulses of modern democratic society,
adjudication was reconfigured in the latter half of the twentieth century to
respond to growing demands for access, leading to the emergence of new
procedural rules and institutional mechanisms designed to open up the justice
system to those who were once systematically excluded—including
historically disfavored minorities, women, and the poor.31 Although these
rules and mechanisms have proven far from sufficient to meet demand, and a
great many people continue to find themselves unable to obtain basic legal
services, litigation rates nonetheless exploded over this time period, putting
tremendous pressure on court dockets worldwide.32 For this reason (among
others), the late twentieth and early twenty-first centuries have witnessed a
retreat from public adjudication, such that the magnificent courtrooms, recently
built to embody the ideals of the democratic state, often remain empty for
lengthy periods of time.33 As various groups decry public adjudication as
wasteful and unnecessary, disputants are encouraged, or required, to bring their
conflicts before administrative agencies or private dispute-resolution providers,
both of which tend to operate outside the public view.34 And to the extent that
disputants continue to find themselves before traditional judges, the latter focus
increasingly on promoting settlement through mediation35—a practice that
occurs behind closed doors and thus does not result in the public discussion
and development of the law.36
Resnik and Curtis therefore conclude that the triumphant nineteenth- and
twentieth-century rise of public adjudication should not lull us into a false
sense of confidence about its ultimate longevity.37 And because adjudication
plays a critical role in sustaining democratic self-governance, the threats that it
faces today, they argue, have grave implications not only for fairness in dispute
resolution, but for the entirety of the modern democratic political project.38
That said, the authors do not end on a note of despair. While the pressures
leading to the retreat from public adjudication may be too significant to
overcome (at least in their entirety), there may be ways, they suggest, to

30. Id. at 306–07.
31. Id. at 307.
32. See id. at 307–08.
33. Id. at 339.
34. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 16.
35. Id. at 16.
36. Id.
37. Id. at 16.
38. See id. at 337 (arguing that as processes of “public participation, accountability,
transparency, and equality” decline, “[t]he audience becomes voyeuristic rather than
participatory, and power flows back to the spectacle’s producers”).
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reconfigure some of the administrative-agency and alternative-disputeresolution mechanisms that have emerged so as to ensure that they are more
compatible with the democratic imperative of public discourse.39 Along
similar lines, they opine, courthouses (and the art adorning them) ought to be
reimagined to engage more openly with the present-day disconnect between a
grandiose narrative of public adjudication and the painful reality of our
multiple failures to live up to our ideals.40 In this respect, the authors suggest,
artists and architects might benefit by recalling some of the earlier visual
traditions that the book recounts and that have long since been largely
abandoned—such as depictions of the pain and violence often entailed in
judgment.41
II. THE PROBLEM OF CONCILIATION
Seeking to construct a genealogy of public adjudication as a defining
feature of modern democratic government, Resnik and Curtis structure their
account to focus on those elements of court practice that through time ended up
contributing to the emergence of this particular form of dispute resolution.42
Conciliation enters their narrative primarily insofar as it is part and parcel of
the recent movement towards alternative dispute resolution (“ADR”)43—a
movement that, according to the authors, poses a significant challenge to the
continued survival of public adjudication as a core democratic practice.44 But
the history of conciliation dates back, of course, much longer than this
movement45—and a closer look at this history suggests that the birth of public
adjudication as a defining feature of modern democracy was intimately linked
to the question of what to do with private conciliation.
This linkage can be seen most clearly in the writings of Jeremy Bentham—
a figure who, not uncoincidentally, is also central to Resnik and Curtis’s
account of the rise of public adjudication as a bulwark of modern democratic
society.46 As the authors argue, Bentham played a key role in developing a
model of public adjudication as conducive to good, democratic governance.47
But what exactly did this effort entail? As Resnik and Curtis demonstrate,
there were some very significant features of court proceedings (as these had
developed across the centuries) that facilitated the construction of Bentham’s
39. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 337.
40. See id. at 344.
41. Id. at 344–49.
42. See id. at 134–224.
43. See id. at 308–10.
44. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 306–07.
45. See infra note 51 and accompanying text (discussing the early identification of
conciliation as a distinct form of dispute resolution).
46. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 295–99.
47. See id. at 297–98.
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model.48 But it is important to note that there were also longstanding features
of court proceedings that ran afoul of this model. Perhaps most problematic
was the tradition of medieval and early-modern European judges serving as
conciliators, aiming not to adjudicate the case by applying the fixed rule of
law, but instead to help the disputants reconcile by persuading them to embrace
some kind of compromise.49 Indeed, for a great many centuries, judges across
Europe (and its colonies) failed clearly to distinguish between their roles as
conciliator and adjudicator.50
This is not to suggest that there was no understanding of the theoretical
differences between adjudication and conciliation. Jurists dating back at least
as far as ancient Rome distinguished between dispute resolution processes that
hinged on the application of a fixed rule of law and those that instead aimed at
compromise and settlement (without regard to the letter of the law).51 In
practice, however, medieval and early modern European courts regularly
blurred this distinction. As revealed by studies of, inter alia, seigneurial courts
in France, municipal, alcalde courts in Spain, and justices of the peace in
England, judges frequently sought to promote informal, equitable conciliation,
rather than (or prior to attempting) formal, legal adjudication—and this was
considered in no way unusual or objectionable.52
How should we make sense of the ubiquity of conciliation in the medieval
and early-modern world? The answer here has much to do with Resnik and
Curtis’s rightful insistence that we recall the important (and frequently
neglected) linkages between practices of dispute resolution and modes of
governance.53 The fact that conciliation was such a common judicial practice
in the medieval and early-modern world54 followed from the way in which
justice was then conceived. Because the polity was understood to be ordered
in accordance with God’s law, the object of justice was to preserve the divinely
ordained, hierarchical social order. As argued by the historian Michel Antoine,
the medieval and early-modern ruler was understood to be a “dispenser of

48. See id. at 296–98.
49. Id. at 296–97.
50. See id. at 296–97.
51. See REINHARD ZIMMERMANN, THE LAW OF OBLIGATIONS: ROMAN FOUNDATIONS OF
THE CIVILIAN TRADITION 528–29 (1996) (discussing the Roman distinction between two
different kinds of arbiters—one required to apply the law and another that was free to seek an
equitable compromise).
52. See, e.g., TAMAR HERZOG, UPHOLDING JUSTICE: SOCIETY, STATE, AND THE PENAL
SYSTEM IN QUITO (1650–1750) 243–45 (2004); NORMA LANDAU, THE JUSTICES OF THE PEACE,
1679–1760, at 173–75 (1984); STEVEN G. REINHARDT, JUSTICE IN THE SARLADAIS 1770–1790,
at 150–52 (1991); Antoine Follain, De la justice seigneuriale à la justice de paix, in UNE JUSTICE
DE PROXIMITÉ: LA JUSTICE DE PAIX (1790–1958) 19, 25–26 (Jacques-Guy Petit ed., 2003).
53. See, e.g., supra notes 42–48 and accompanying text.
54. See infra notes 60–78 and accompanying text.
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justice,” whose role it was to arbitrate between groups, thereby restoring
harmony and preserving the status quo.55 This essentially static conception of
justice proved particularly hospitable to the practice of conciliation because the
latter was focused first and foremost on resolving conflict, and thus on
peacemaking.56 At the same time, because medieval and early-modern
European judges frequently promoted conciliation by relying on their high
standing in the community to persuade disputants to defer to their wisdom and
authority, the very act of encouraging conciliation served to reinforce traditions
of hierarchy and deference.57
Given these historic linkages between practices of conciliation and
political and social traditions of hierarchy and deference, conciliation posed a
problem for would-be democrats like Bentham (and, indeed, for the late
eighteenth-century age of revolution as a whole). While conciliation appeared
to be antithetical to democratic self-governance, it constituted a sizeable
component of what courts actually did (and what people expected them to do),
and thus could not simply be wished away.58 Looking to contemporary
European (and especially French) practice, Bentham thought he might have
discovered a solution to this dilemma in the establishment of what he called
“conciliation courts” (or sometimes “reconciliation courts”).59 Such courts, he
hoped, would institutionalize the practice of court-based conciliation in ways
that clearly set it apart from—and thus protected the sanctity of—adjudication
proper.
The French created the first conciliation courts in 1790, shortly after they
embarked on their revolutionary experiment in government.60 Known as
bureaux de conciliation, or conciliation offices, these institutions were required
to attempt to reconcile disputants in a wide range of civil matters.61 Only if
such efforts failed was litigation to proceed.62 The conciliation proceedings
themselves were to be an informal, lawyer-free affair, relying largely on oral
pleadings and taking place in secret, outside the public’s view—namely, in the

55. Michel Antoine, La monarchie française de François Ier à Louis XVI, in LES
187–89 (Emmanuel Le Roy Ladurie ed., 1986).
56. See supra note 52 and accompanying text; infra notes 60–78 and accompanying text.
57. See infra notes 65–70, 82–84 and accompanying text.
58. See supra note 54 and accompanying text; infra notes 82–85 and accompanying text.
59. See Amalia D. Kessler, Deciding Against Conciliation: The Nineteenth-Century
Rejection of a European Transplant and the Rise of a Distinctively American Ideal of Adversarial
Adjudication, 10 THEORETICAL INQUIRIES L. 423, 429, 436–38 (2009) [hereinafter Kessler,
Deciding Against Conciliation].
60. Amalia D. Kessler, Marginalization and Myth: The Corporatist Roots of France’s
Forgotten Elective Judiciary, 58 AM. J. COMP. L. 679, 698 (2010) [hereinafter Kessler,
Marginalization and Myth].
61. See id.
62. Id.
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presence only of the parties and court personnel.63 These courts were, in turn,
to be staffed by a newly created group of officers known as justices of the
peace, each of whom was to be assisted by two assesseurs prud’hommes
(literally, assistant wise men).64 As initially contemplated, both the justices of
the peace and the assesseurs prud’hommes were to be mere amateurs, lacking
any legal training,65 and elected by eligible voters in the district66 because of
their reputation for wisdom and virtue.67 Remarkably, even after Napoleon
reconfigured these courts to eliminate the assesseurs prud’hommes and to
ensure that judicial selection would henceforth reside in his hands alone,68
nineteenth-century French justices of the peace continued generally to be
locals, born in the region where they served and described by one historian as
“small-scale notable[s] close to the peasantry.”69 Such local bigwigs were
expected to rely on their standing within the community, rather than any legal
knowledge per se, to conciliate intra-community disputes.70
In addition to the bureaux de conciliation, the French established a number
of other judicial institutions in this period that relied heavily on community
leaders to promote informal conciliation and were therefore often lumped
together with the former. In particular, the Napoleonic regime created a set of
labor courts, known as conseils de prud’hommes, that paralleled the bureaux
de conciliation in certain key respects.71 Designed to help quell the extensive

63. ANTHONY CRUBAUGH, BALANCING THE SCALES OF JUSTICE: LOCAL COURTS AND
RURAL SOCIETY IN SOUTHWEST FRANCE, 1750–1800, at 132, 141 (2001); Jean Léonnet, Une
création de l’Assemblée constituante, la conciliation judiciaire, in UNE AUTRE JUSTICE:
CONTRIBUTIONS À L’HISTOIRE DE LA JUSTICE SOUS LA RÉVOLUTION FRANÇAISE 267, 273
(Robert Badinter ed., 1989).
64. CRUBAUGH, supra note 63, at 133, 141. The position of assesseur was abolished in
1801. Id. at 146.
65. Id. at 135–36, 146; ISSER WOLOCH, THE NEW REGIME: TRANSFORMATIONS OF THE
FRENCH CIVIC ORDER, 1789–1820S, at 307–08 (1994); see also Richard M. Andrews, The
Justices of the Peace of Revolutionary Paris, September 1792–November 1794 (Frimaire Year
III), PAST & PRESENT, Aug. 1971, at 56, 58–60 (1971).
66. GEORGE MARTIN, LES JUSTICES DE PAIX EN FRANCE: MANUEL PRATIQUE DES JUGES DE
PAIX 2 (1880); WOLOCH, supra note 65, at 307–08.
67. 11 D. DALLOZ, JURISPRUDENCE GÉNÉRALE: RÉPERTOIRE MÉTHODIQUE ET
ALPHABETIQUE DE LÉGISLATION DE DOCTRINE ET DE JURISPRUDENCE 88–89 (1849); see also
HENRION DE PANSEY, DE LA COMPÉTENCE DES JUGES DE PAIX 3 (4th ed. 1816).
68. MARTIN, supra note 66, at 405–06; WOLOCH, supra note 65, at 319.
69. Jean-Claude Farcy, Les juges de paix et la politique au XIXe siècle, in UNE JUSTICE DE
PROXIMITÉ: LA JUSTICE DE PAIX (1790–1958), supra note 52, at 143, 161; see also Serge Defois
& Vincent Bernaudeau, Les juges de paix de Loire-Atlantique (1895–1958): une magistrature de
proximité?, in UNE JUSTICE DE PROXIMITÉ: LA JUSTICE DE PAIX (1790–1958), supra note 52, at
195, 200–01.
70. See supra notes 64–69 and accompanying text.
71. See WILLIAM H. MCPHERSON & FREDERIC MEYERS, THE FRENCH LABOR COURTS:
JUDGMENT BY PEERS 15–16 (1966).

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW

1108

SAINT LOUIS UNIVERSITY LAW JOURNAL

[Vol. 56:1099

labor strife that emerged in the wake of the Napoleonic Wars,72 these courts
were staffed by lay judges (usually the leading manufacturers in the
community, elected by their peers)73 and were required to prioritize informal
conciliation over formal adjudication.74
Along similar lines, the
revolutionaries and Napoleonic regime opted to retain a set of merchant-run
courts (juridictions consulaires) that dated back to the sixteenth century.75
Renamed tribunaux de commerce, or commercial courts, these institutions also
relied on elected lay judges—in particular, leading local merchants—and
tended to place a heavy emphasis on informal conciliation.76
As of the late eighteenth and early nineteenth centuries, the French had
thus established a number of different institutions that could be described as
conciliation courts. And in these waning days of French influence, a variety of
European countries (including, Spain, Denmark, and Rhenish Prussia) opted—
either on their own initiative or under military compulsion—to adopt some
form of conciliation court within their borders.77 While conceptualized as
radically new, all of these institutions drew in practice on longstanding
traditions of judicial conciliation. For example, the French bureaux de
conciliation were themselves in many ways the direct descendents of the
abolished seigneurial courts of the Old Regime, such that the personnel and
files of the latter were often transferred directly to the new bureaux.78

72. See id.
73. Décret contentant réglement sur les conseils de prud’hommes (11 juin 1809), in
COLLECTION COMPLÈTE DES LOIS, DÉCRETS, ORDONNANCES, RÉGLEMENS, AVIS DU CONSEILD’ETAT 386, 387–88 (J. B. Duvergier ed., 1836).
74. MCPHERSON & MEYERS, supra note 71, at 16; Alain Cottereau, Justice et injustice
ordinaire sur les lieux de travail d’après les audiences prud’homales (1806–1866), LE
MOUVEMENT SOCIAL, Oct.–Dec. 1987, at 25, 35; Monique Kieffer, La législation prud’homale de
1806 à 1907, LE MOUVEMENT SOCIAL, Oct.–Dec. 1987, at 9, 12.
75. AMALIA D. KESSLER, A REVOLUTION IN COMMERCE: THE PARISIAN MERCHANT
COURT AND THE RISE OF COMMERCIAL SOCIETY IN EIGHTEENTH-CENTURY FRANCE 2 (2007).
For a discussion of the Old Regime juridictions consulaires, see generally id.
76. See id. at 70–74; Claire Lemercier, The Judge, the Expert and the Arbitrator: The
Strange Case of the Paris Court of Commerce (ca. 1800–ca. 1880), in FIELDS OF EXPERTISE: A
COMPARATIVE HISTORY OF EXPERT PROCEDURES IN PARIS AND LONDON, 1600 TO PRESENT
115, 130–35 (Christelle Rabier ed., 2007).
77. JOSE SANCHEZ-ARCILLA BERNAL, HISTORIA DE LAS INSTITUCIONES POLITICOADMINISTRATIVAS CONTEMPORANEAS (1808–1975) 405 (1994); DON JOSÉ DE VICENTE Y
CARAVANTES, TRATADO HISTÓRICO, CRITICO FILOSÓFICO DE LOS PROCEDIMIENTOS
JUDICIALES EN MATERIA CIVIL, SEGUN LA NUEVA LEY DE ENJUICIAMIENTO; CON SUS
CORRESPONDIENTES FORMULARIOS 448 (1856); COMPANION TO THE ALMANAC 42 (1857);
Annemarie Højer Pedersen, “Skranker for Lovtrækkeriets Krumveie”: De Danske
Forligskommissioner Deres Nedlaæggelse Og Genopstaen? §§ 1.2, 2.1 (Mar. 2005) (unpublished
M.A. thesis, Copehagen University) (on file with author).
78. Kessler, Marginalization and Myth, supra note 60, at 699.
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Observing these developments, Bentham devoted a great deal of energy to
trying to make sense of them, and his writings on this topic played a decisive
role in creating the notion of a “conciliation court” as a kind of ideal type—one
with which jurists and policy-makers thereafter grappled well into the latter
half of the nineteenth century.79 But why precisely were Bentham and the
many he influenced so interested in these institutions? Part of the answer is
that Bentham viewed conciliation courts as an embodiment (or at least near
approximation) of his ideal of “natural procedure”—by which he meant that
universal set of common-sense methods that a father would use to resolve
disputes among the various dependents within the patriarchal home.80 As such,
natural procedure, he hoped, would make it possible to avoid the great costs
and delays associated with the “technical procedure” employed in ordinary
courts of law.81 But while admiring conciliation courts and their natural
procedure as a possible antidote (or at least an alternative) to the woes of
technical procedure, he also recognized that there was little place for them in
the democratic polity for which he longed.82 In his view, it was perfectly
acceptable for the father of the household to draw on his patriarchal authority
as a means of encouraging dependents to reconcile, but citizens of a
democratic society ought not to be placed in such a position of submission visà-vis the judicial officers of the state.83 Because “[i]n the system of
conciliation, the equality [that reigns at law] is destroyed,”84 Bentham
ultimately concluded that conciliation courts ought to be used only for the
resolution of intra-familial disputes.85
But while Bentham assigned conciliation courts a very limited role within
the democratic polity, they were nonetheless essential to his thinking,
reappearing throughout his writings on procedure and evidence.86 And his
reflections on these institutions were deeply compelling to many of his
nineteenth-century readers.87 Resnik and Curtis’s book helps us to understand
why this was so. Conceptualizing the nature and limits of conciliation courts
was a means of going about the difficult task of defining the contours of

79.
80.
81.
82.
83.
84.

Kessler, Deciding Against Conciliation, supra note 59, at 431–32, 434–36.
See id. at 436–37.
Id. at 434–35.
See id. at 437.
Id.
Kessler, Deciding Against Conciliation, supra note 59, at 441 (quoting JEREMY
BENTHAM, De l’organisation judiciaire, et de la codification, in 3 ŒUVRES DE J. BENTHAM,
JURISCONSULTE ANGLAIS 51 (Étienne Dumont ed., 1829–30)).
85. Id. at 441–42.
86. See, e.g., 6 JEREMY BENTHAM, Rationale of Judicial Evidence, Specially Applied to
English Practice, in THE WORKS OF JEREMY BENTHAM 366 (John Bowring ed., 1843).
87. Kessler, Deciding Against Conciliation, supra note 59, at 442.
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adjudication proper.88 Put differently, it was in precisely those public, nonfamilial realms in which conciliation had no place that Bentham hoped to
develop a robust, democracy-promoting practice of adjudication. And given
the centuries-old tradition of European judges engaging in both adjudication
and conciliation (and failing clearly to differentiate between the two),89 the
effort thus to distinguish between conciliation and adjudication was not simply
a matter of theoretical line drawing, but also an attempt to solve a concrete,
real-world problem.
The irony, of course, is that despite Bentham’s efforts, a sharp delineation
between conciliation and adjudication failed in practice to materialize. While
the transnational history of conciliation courts has yet to be told, and there is
therefore much about these institutions that we still do not know, the
overarching narrative is one of decline. To the limited extent that such courts
have survived, they now appear (for a complex variety of reasons) to engage at
least as much in formal adjudication as in informal conciliation.90 The original
bureaux de conciliation, for example, were abolished in 1958.91 And while the
French labor and commercial courts persist to this day, it is generally agreed
that they have become much less effective at facilitating conciliation than was
once the case and instead often apply the formal rule of law.92 Conversely, as
described by Resnik and Curtis, over the last several decades, ordinary nonconciliation courts have become increasingly committed to promoting various
kinds of alternative dispute resolution, including court-based mediation or
conciliation.93 Thus, just as conciliation courts have turned towards formal
adjudication, so, too, ordinary courts have turned towards conciliation.94 The
end result is a conceptual and institutional blurring of these practices that is
reminiscent in this respect of the medieval and early-modern European judicial
experience.
III. SOME MUSINGS FROM HISTORY
What lessons should we draw from this history? While history is not
particularly useful for developing detailed policy prescriptions, it can suggest

88. See supra notes 46–48 and accompanying text.
89. See supra notes 49–52 and accompanying text.
90. See, e.g., Kessler, Deciding Against Conciliation, supra note 59, at 469–70.
91. ANDREW WEST, YVON DESDEVISES, ALAIN FENET, DOMINIQUE GAURIER & MARIECLET HEUSSAFF, THE FRENCH LEGAL SYSTEM: AN INTRODUCTION 87–88 (1992) (“Since 1958,
small civil claims have been dealt with by the Tribunaux d’Instance. These courts replaced the
earlier system of civil justices of the peace (juges de paix).”).
92. Michel Armand-Prevost, Fonctionnement et enjeux des tribunaux de commerce au cours
des XIXe et XXe siècles, in LES TRIBUNAUX DE COMMERCE: GENÈSE ET ENJEUX D’UNE
INSTITUTION 129, 138 (2007); Cottereau, supra note 74, at 38; Kieffer, supra note 74, at 15.
93. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 308.
94. See supra notes 90–93 and accompanying text.
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broad patterns or trends and, in so doing, help to identify, inter alia, risks to be
avoided. In this respect, the history of conciliation retold here serves to
reinforce points that Resnik and Curtis themselves make. Most importantly,
the fact that conciliation was linked to a medieval and early-modern political
commitment to the preservation of a hierarchical status quo95—and that those
(like Bentham) who lived at the dawn of democratic revolution viewed it as
imperative to limit conciliation’s reach96—reminds us that there are potential
dangers to the unrestrained flourishing of conciliation in (and out of) our
courts. Similarly, the fact that it has proven so difficult to follow through on
Bentham’s goal of institutionalizing a sharp delineation between conciliation
and adjudication underscores the authors’ argument that we ought not to
presume the indestructibility of adjudication as a democracy-promoting,
discursive sphere.97 Finally, the remarkable staying power of conciliation
suggests that it is likely to be with us for the long run. This, in turn, lends
support to Resnik and Curtis’s conclusion that, moving forward, the answer is
not to wish ADR away (as this is not likely to happen) but instead to find ways
of making it more compatible with democratic governance, including most
importantly, by opening it up to public view.98
That it is important to identify ways of making ADR practices like
conciliation more public does not, however, mean that this prescription is a
cure-all. Setting aside the much debated (and never clearly resolved) question
of whether conciliation does in fact require some degree of privacy to work (a
view that Bentham himself expressed),99 we are left with the even more
difficult question of what precisely we gain by opening up conciliation to
public view? To the extent that the conciliating judge is free to depart from the
rule of law, the utility of conciliation as a sphere for meaningfully deciding
matters of social policy is limited. If the aim is to preserve dispute resolution
as a sphere of democratic self-governance, it may therefore ultimately be more
important to find ways of making formal, public adjudication cheaper and,
thus, more readily accessible to all.
How precisely to accomplish this goal is an enormously difficult question
whose resolution lies well beyond the scope of these pages. An extensive
literature exists on the costs of litigation, much of it bemoaning the difficulties
of obtaining sound, reliable empirical evidence.100 And while, despite such
95. See supra notes 54–57 and accompanying text.
96. Kessler, Deciding Against Conciliation, supra note 59, at 442.
97. See supra notes 2–3, 82–83, 94 and accompanying text.
98. RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 321.
99. See BENTHAM, supra note 86, at 366 (“Publicity in these cases . . . can have no better
effect than that of pouring poison into whatever wounds have already been sustained.”).
100. See, e.g., Thomas E. Willging, Past and Potential Uses of Empirical Research in Civil
Rulemaking, 77 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1121, 1127–38 (2002) (discussing, inter alia, limitations
inherent in various kinds of empirical studies of procedural rules). See generally Judith A.
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empirical difficulties, some have identified particular costs as excessive—
including, perhaps most importantly, those associated with discovery and
attorneys’ fees—others are equally vocal in countering these assertions.101
Moreover, in reading this literature, it is hard to avoid the conclusion that each
author’s bottom line is shaped at least in part by normative assessments of the
value of the procedural form in question that are reached independently of
questions of cost.102
That said, given the themes of this conference—and, in particular, the
focus on aggregation—it is worth emphasizing that aggregation itself is one
possible approach to generating cost-savings in adjudication. The class action,
in particular, affords significant economies of scale. By reducing litigation
costs for each individual, the class device makes it possible to litigate lowvalue claims that, but for group action, would likely be too costly to pursue.103
The problem, of course, is that class actions do not feel economical, in that the
cost-savings they afford are evident only when the costs that they entail are
compared to the sum total of damages incurred and the cost of filing numerous
individual actions. Since, but for the class action, most of these individuals
would not file suit, the cost of their injuries—and the concomitant cost of
vindicating their rights through a series of individual suits (even assuming that
such a course of action were possible)—are not readily taken into account in
the political process. The end result is that, as Resnik herself has documented

McKenna & Elizabeth C. Wiggins, Empirical Research on Civil Discovery, 39 B.C. L. REV. 785
(1998) (summarizing empirical studies on discovery and discussing the limitations of various
approaches used).
101. See, for example, the debate over discovery outlined in McKenna & Wiggins, supra note
100, at 787–89. See also Charles Silver, Does Civil Justice Cost Too Much?, 80 TEX. L. REV.
2073, 2086–98 (2002) (discussing the debate over discovery and attorneys’ fees).
102. For example, even if (as is unlikely) we were all to agree with the authors of a recent
Federal Judicial Center (“FJC”) report that discovery accounted for approximately twenty to fifty
percent of the total cost of an average, non-complex litigation, is that percentage too big, too
small, or perfectly reasonable? See Emery G. Lee III & Thomas E. Willging, Defining the
Problem of Cost in Federal Civil Litigation, 60 DUKE L.J. 765, 779–82 (2010) (discussing, inter
alia, the FJC report that they authored). The authors of the FJC study use these numbers to
dispute the claim that discovery costs are excessive, arguing that even fifty percent represents a
much smaller percentage of total costs than the seventy percent that many critics of discovery had
previously estimated. Id. at 781–82. But is twenty to fifty percent reasonable in and of itself?
An answer to this question depends in no small part on the benefits that we think we gain from
discovery, some of which (like the notion that the dispute will be resolved in accordance with the
truth) may not be readily quantifiable. And to the extent that discovery is thought to benefit
particular classes of plaintiffs, including most importantly, those (like civil rights claimants)
whose claims rest on evidence likely to be in the defendants’ possession, our view of the cost of
discovery may turn on our normative assessment of the underlying substantive law and our
political sympathies (or lack thereof) for these particular plaintiffs and defendants.
103. See Jon Romberg, Half a Loaf is Predominant and Superior to None: Class Certification
of Particular Issues Under Rule 23(c)(4)(A), 2002 Utah L. Rev. 249, 258–59, 264 (2002).
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elsewhere, sustaining the political will necessary to maintain the class action as
a robust procedural device has proven quite a challenge.104
There may, however, be some hope in the rather ironic fact that, even as
American courts have become increasingly skeptical of the class action,
countries around the world have begun experimenting with the form.105 As
Deborah Hensler, John Coffee, and others have emphasized, these new, nonAmerican devices are quite different from the American variant, often for
example, providing only for opt-in (rather than opt-out) classes and relying on
third-party financing, rather than the contingency fee.106 Whether these new
procedural devices will survive and prove efficacious remains to be seen. But
it is possible that experimentation with forms of aggregation abroad might
ultimately provide some inspiration for how to reinvent the class action here in
the United States—perhaps in a fashion that eliminates, or at least cabins, some
of its historically more controversial features.
But whatever the eventual outcome of the current experimentation with
aggregation (and with the class action in particular), the broader point is that,
in searching for cost-savings in public adjudication, we ought to take heed of
another key historical lesson of Representing Justice—namely, the importance
of the transnational.107 As Resnik and Curtis emphasize, the rise of
adjudication as a democracy-promoting practice that was itself fundamentally
challenged and transformed by the post-WWII empowerment of new groups
of rights-holders was—and remains—a fundamentally transnational
phenomenon.108 Thus, while the challenges that adjudication faces are global,
so too perhaps are the solutions.

104. See Judith Resnik, Fairness in Numbers: A Comment on AT&T v. Concepcion, WalMart v. Dukes, and Turner v. Rogers, 125 HARV. L. REV. 78, 145–48, 162–69 (2011).
105. Richard A. Nagareda, Aggregate Litigation Across the Atlantic and the Future of
American Exceptionalism, 62 VAND. L. REV. 1, 4 (2009).
106. John C. Coffee, Jr., Litigation Governance: Taking Accountability Seriously, 110
COLUM. L. REV. 288, 301, 339, 341 (2010); Deborah R. Hensler, The Future of Mass Litigation:
Global Class Actions and Third-Party Litigation Funding, 79 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 306, 307–08,
322 (2011); see also Nagareda, supra note 105, at 21–25.
107. See RESNIK & CURTIS, supra note 1, at 14–15.
108. See id. at 14.
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